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Direct Democracy as a Legislative Act 
Henry Noyes* 
INTRODUCTION 
Direct democracy has been referred to as “The People’s Law”1 
and “Citizen Lawmaking.”2 The actors who engage in acts of 
direct democracy have been referred to as “Citizen Lawmakers”3 
and “Citizens as Legislators.”4 Does that mean that citizens who 
engage in acts of direct democracy are literally (and legally) 
“legislators” undertaking legislative acts? This Article argues 
that, at least in certain situations, the answer is “yes” and 
considers the implications of that conclusion. 
Part I briefly discusses the history of direct democracy in the 
United States. Direct democracy was born out of frustration with 
reliance on elected representatives to legislate. Direct democracy 
allows ordinary citizens to legislate. Part II explains that direct 
democracy does not diminish some inherent, immutable power of 
the legislature. Instead, it is an exercise of the people’s inherent 
power to legislate. All power derives from the people, who can 
choose to delegate it to representative instruments which they 
create, or they can reserve to themselves the power to legislate. 
Several states—Arizona, California, Washington, Colorado, 
Oregon, and Utah—have constitutions that define the initiative 
and referendum as the exercise of legislative power. Part III 
discusses the circumstances in which direct democracy activity is 
a legally operative legislative act. At a minimum, the act of 
sponsoring an initiative or referendum petition is a legislative 
act. Finally, Part IV discusses some of the possible legal 
implications of the conclusion that direct democracy (or at least 
some such activity) is a legislative act. First, undertaking a 
legislative act does not implicate the First Amendment. Second, 
 
 * Professor of Law, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. 
 1 See generally CHARLES SUMNER LOBINGIER, THE PEOPLE’S LAW OR POPULAR 
PARTICIPATION IN LAW-MAKING (1909). 
 2 See generally JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE INITIATIVE: CITIZEN LAWMAKING (SUNY 
Press, 2d ed. 2014) (1999). 
 3 DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION, at 
ix (1989). 
 4 Samuel C. Patterson, Foreword to CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
IN THE UNITED STATES, at viii (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998). 
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undertaking a legislative act entails legislative immunity and a 
legislative privilege. Third, direct democracy as a legislative act 
(in some cases) will confer the official proponents with standing 
to defend the initiative against legal challenge. 
I. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Direct democracy has existed in the United States since the 
first town hall meetings were held in the American colonies in 
the 1600s.5 These town hall meetings allowed citizens to propose 
new laws and to veto laws passed by their elected 
representatives. Three of the earliest state constitutions included 
some features of direct democracy. The Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1776 provided for the recall of public officials.6 
The Massachusetts and New Hampshire Constitutions were the 
product of citizen lawmaking. These states held constitutional 
conventions at which citizens drafted a constitution and then 
submitted it to the people for their approval.7 
Modern direct democracy began with the adoption and 
implementation of the primary tools of direct democracy—the 
ballot initiative, the referendum and the recall election—in the 
late 1800s and the early 1900s as a result of the Populist and 
Progressive movements.8 Populists wanted to take back control of 
government for ordinary citizens from the hands of the moneyed 
elite. Progressives wanted to improve government by making it 
more responsive to the will of the people and less corrupt. The 
ballot initiative allows the people of a state (or local government) 
to make law without action by their elected representatives. The 
referendum allows the people of a state (or local government) to 
have submitted for their approval any law enacted by their 
elected representatives. 
The initiative operates entirely outside the States’ representative 
assemblies; it allows “voters [to] petition to propose statutes or 
constitutional amendments to be adopted or rejected by the voters at 
the polls.” While the initiative allows the electorate to adopt positive 
legislation, the referendum serves as a negative check. It allows 
“voters [to] petition to refer a legislative action to the voters [for 
approval or disapproval] at the polls. “The initiative [thus] corrects 
sins of omission” by representative bodies, while the “referendum 
corrects sins of commission.”9 
 
 5 See, e.g., LOBINGIER, supra note 1, at 81; Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2015). 
 6 JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE RECALL: TRIBUNAL OF THE PEOPLE 7 (SUNY Press, 2d 
ed. 2013) (1970). 
 7 HENRY S. NOYES, THE LAW OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 4 (2014). 
 8 Id. at 9–10. 
 9 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2660 (citations omitted) (quoting Lewis J. 
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Between 1898 and 1918, twenty-four states adopted the 
initiative, the referendum, or both.10 Today, three states utilize 
the veto referendum, three states utilize the ballot initiative and, 
twenty-one states utilize both the veto referendum and the ballot 
initiative.11 
II. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IS AN EXERCISE OF THE PEOPLE’S 
INHERENT LEGISLATIVE POWER 
A. All Political Power Is Inherent in the People 
Direct democracy is an exercise of the people’s inherent 
legislative power. It is not a delegation of power from the state 
legislature, nor is it a diminishment of power inherent in the 
state legislature. It is a direct and express exercise of the people’s 
inherent legislative power.12 
This concept—that the power to legislate and govern is an 
exercise of the people’s inherent power—is expressed in the 
Declaration of Independence13 and the constitution of every state 
except New York.14 The U.S. Supreme Court recently stated that 
“the animating principle of our Constitution [is] that the people 
themselves are the originating source of all the powers of 
government.”15 Because the people hold the power to legislate, 
they may choose to delegate this power to representatives, or 
they may choose to reserve the power for themselves. Direct 
democracy is the most direct expression of the people’s power to 
govern themselves.16 
 
Johnson, Direct Legislation as an Ally of Representative Government, in THE INITIATIVE, 
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 139, 142 (William B. Munro ed., 1912); DAVID B. MAGLEBY, 
DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1984)). 
 10 NOYES, supra note 7, at 10. 
 11 Id. at 78 tbl.3.1, 104 tbl.4.1. 
 12 See id. at 10–12. 
 13 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the 
Governed . . . [and] it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new 
Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles and organizing its Powers in such 
Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”). 
 14 NOYES, supra note 7, at 11 (setting forth all citations in every state constitution, 
except New York, that support the proposition that all political power is inherent in the 
people). 
 15 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2671 
(2015); see also id. at 2675 (“[O]ur fundamental instrument of government derives its 
authority from ‘We the People.’”); U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the 
Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained 
by the people.”); id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.”). 
 16 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2674 (“[T]he invention of the initiative was in 
full harmony with the Constitution’s conception of the people as the font of governmental 
power.”). 
Do Not Delete 3/5/2016 12:01 PM 
202 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 19:1 
B. The Initiative and the Referendum Are Part of the People’s 
Legislative Power 
The Supreme Court has declared that—in states that adopt 
these tools of direct democracy—use of the initiative or the 
referendum is an exercise of the people’s legislative power. In 
Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant17 the Supreme Court considered 
an early challenge to Ohio’s use of the referendum power. 
Hildebrant involved an amendment to the Constitution of Ohio 
that adopted the veto referendum.18 
[T]he legislative power was expressly declared to be vested not only in 
the senate and house of representatives of the state, constituting the 
general assembly, but in the people, in whom a right was reserved by 
way of referendum to approve or disapprove by popular vote any law 
enacted by the general assembly.19 
The Ohio General Assembly passed an act redistricting Ohio 
for the purpose of congressional elections, and the Governor 
approved the act. The requisite number of Ohio electors then 
signed a referendum petition and the measure was put to a 
popular vote.20 The voters disapproved the law and Ohio state 
election officials filed an action seeking to declare the referendum 
void as violative of the Elections Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.21 The Elections Clause of Article I of the 
Constitution provides: 
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations . . . .22 
The elections officials claimed that “the referendum vote was not 
and could not be a part of the legislative authority of the state.”23  
The Supreme Court rejected the challenge to Ohio’s 
referendum power. The Court held that the State of Ohio had the 
power to allocate its governmental authority according to the 
wishes of the people of Ohio, including the power to legislate. 
 
 17 Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 566–67 (1916). 
 18 Id. at 566. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See id. at 567. The elections officials also claimed that the referendum violated the 
Guarantee Clause. See id. at 569. Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution provides 
that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form 
of Government . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The Supreme Court rejected that challenge 
because it did not present a justiciable issue. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 570. For a discussion 
of challenges to direct democracy as violative of the Republican Guarantee Clause, see 
NOYES, supra note 7, at 12–29 and authorities cited therein. 
 22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 23 Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 567. 
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Ohio, like numerous other states, had amended its state 
constitution to incorporate the power of referendum. The Ohio 
Supreme Court had determined that the amendment to the state 
constitution was valid—that is, the referendum power 
constituted a part of the state constitution and laws.24 That 
determination was binding on the U.S. Supreme Court. The 
U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the referendum was 
“part of the [state] legislative power”25 consistent with the 
Elections Clause and answered in the affirmative. Congress had 
the power to alter Ohio’s redistricting scheme, but the Supreme 
Court noted that Congress, in recognition of the direct democracy 
movement, had modified the applicable federal statutes “to provide 
that where, by the state Constitution and laws, the referendum 
was treated as a part of the legislative power, the power as thus 
constituted should be held and treated to be the state legislative 
power for the purpose of creating congressional districts by law.”26 
The Supreme Court again recognized the right of the people 
to retain their legislative power, and also made clear that the 
referendum did not constitute an improper delegation of 
legislative power, in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 
Inc.27 City of Eastlake involved a challenge to a city charter 
provision requiring “that any changes in land use agreed to by 
the Council be approved by a 55% Vote in a referendum.”28 
Plaintiffs argued that the Ohio city’s adoption of this referendum 
requirement for certain zoning changes was an unconstitutional 
delegation to the people of a legislative power. The Court rejected 
that challenge, stating: 
A referendum cannot, however, be characterized as a delegation of 
power. Under our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from 
the people, who can delegate it to representative instruments which 
they create. In establishing legislative bodies, the people can reserve 
to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might 
otherwise be assigned to the legislature.29 
The Court confirmed that the people may choose to delegate their 
legislative power to elected representatives, but they also may 
choose to retain their legislative power. 
 
 24 Id. at 567–68. 
 25 Id. at 568; see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2015) (“For redistricting purposes, Hildebrant thus established, 
‘the Legislature’ did not mean the representative body alone. Rather, the word 
encompassed a veto power lodged in the people.”). 
 26 Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 568. 
 27 City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976) (“In 
establishing legislative bodies, the people can reserve to themselves power to deal directly 
with matters which might otherwise be assigned to the legislature.”). 
 28 Id. at 670. 
 29 Id. at 672 (citations omitted). 
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In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission,30 the Court confirmed that the 
exercise of the initiative power is an exercise of the people’s 
legislative power. By ballot initiative, the people of Arizona 
amended the Arizona Constitution to remove redistricting 
authority—the power to create and adopt congressional and state 
legislative districts—from the Arizona Legislature and to vest it 
in an independent commission.31 The Arizona Legislature sued, 
complaining that Arizona’s exercise of direct democracy violated 
the Elections Clause of Article I of the Constitution.32 In short, 
the Court had to determine whether the phrase “the Legislature” 
in the Elections Clause included only Arizona’s official body of 
elected representatives (the Arizona House and Senate) or 
whether “the Legislature” also included the Arizona voters when 
engaged in direct democracy. 
The Court held that the “lawmaking power in Arizona 
includes the initiative process.”33 When the voters engaged in 
direct democracy, they constituted “the Legislature.” 
The Framers may not have imagined the modern initiative process in 
which the people of a State exercise legislative power coextensive with 
the authority of an institutional legislature. But the invention of the 
initiative was in full harmony with the Constitution’s conception of 
the people as the font of governmental power.34 
The Court recognized the right and power of individual 
states to determine the structure of their government and to 
determine who may exercise governmental authority.35 The 
U.S. Supreme Court considered the text of the Arizona 
Constitution, and the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
that text, and concluded “the Arizona Constitution ‘establishes 
the electorate [of Arizona] as a coordinate source of legislation’ on 
equal footing with the representative legislative body.”36 
 
 30 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658–59. 
 31 Id. 
 32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”). 
 33 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2659; see also id. at 2660 n.3 (“The people’s 
sovereign right to incorporate themselves into a State’s lawmaking apparatus, by 
reserving for themselves the power to adopt laws and to veto measures passed by elected 
representatives, is one this Court has ranked a nonjusticiable political matter.”). 
 34 Id. at 2674.  
 35 Id. at 2673. 
 36 Id. at 2660 (quoting Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai City Bd. of 
Supervisors, 501 P.2d 391, 393 (Ariz. 1972)); see also id. at 2673 (“Arizona engaged in 
definition of that kind when its people placed both the initiative power and the AIRC’s 
redistricting authority in the portion of the Arizona Constitution delineating the State’s 
legislative authority.”). 
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C.  State Constitutions Define the Initiative and Referendum as 
the Exercise of Legislative Power 
A number of states in addition to Arizona have state 
constitutions that define the initiative and referendum as the 
exercise of legislative power. Article IV of the California 
Constitution states: “The legislative power of this State is vested 
in the California Legislature which consists of the Senate and 
Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers of 
initiative and referendum.”37 The California Supreme Court has 
interpreted the initiative power to “represent[] an exercise by the 
people of their reserved power to legislate.”38 In the Washington 
Constitution, the initiative power and referendum powers are 
found in article II (“Legislative Department”), section 1 
(“Legislative Powers, Where Vested”).39 The Washington 
Supreme Court has stated that the “exercise of the initiative 
power is an exercise of the reserved power of the people to 
legislate” and that “[in] approving an initiative measure, the 
people exercise the same power of sovereignty as the Legislature 
does when enacting a statute.”40 In the Colorado Constitution, 
the initiative and referendum powers are found in article V 
(“Legislative Department”),41 and the Colorado Supreme Court 
has stated that “the people have reserved for themselves the 
right to legislate.”42 Oregon and Utah also have concluded that 
the exercise of the initiative and referendum power is the 
exercise of the people’s legislative power.43 
 
 
 37 CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 38 Builders Ass’n of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Counties v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 
582, 586 (Cal. 1974). 
 39 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 40 Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 11 P.3d 762, 779 (Wash. 2000). 
 41 COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“The legislative power of the state shall be vested in the 
general assembly consisting of a senate and house of representatives, both to be elected by 
the people, but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and 
amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent 
of the general assembly and also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at 
the polls any act or item, section, or part of any act of the general assembly.”). 
 42 McKee v. City of Louisville, 616 P.2d 969, 972 (Colo. 1980). 
 43 See OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“The legislative power of the state, except for the 
initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people, is vested in a Legislative 
Assembly, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”); MacPherson v. Dep’t 
of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 314 (Or. 2006) (“In Oregon, the Legislative Assembly and 
the people, acting through the initiative or referendum processes, share in exercising 
legislative power.”); UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1 (“The Legislative Power of the State shall be 
vested in: (a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the 
Legislature of the State of Utah; and (b) the people of the State of Utah . . . .”); Gallivan 
v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1080 (Utah 2002) (“[T]he Utah Constitution vests the people’s 
sovereign legislative power in both (1) a representative legislature and (2) the people of 
the State, in whom all political power is inherent.”). 
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III. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AS LEGISLATIVE ACT 
A.  Initiative Petition Circulation and Signature-Gathering and 
the First Amendment 
The Supreme Court has reviewed various state law 
requirements relating to direct democracy activities and has 
assessed these requirements against First Amendment 
challenges. In Meyer v. Grant,44 the Court considered a challenge 
to Colorado’s ban on payment of petition circulators. The Court 
found that “circulation of an initiative petition of necessity 
involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a 
discussion of the merits of the proposed change.”45 The Court 
concluded that the Colorado law involved a limitation on political 
expression and was, therefore, subject to exacting scrutiny under 
the First Amendment.46 The Court struck down the Colorado law 
because circulation of a petition involved “core political speech” 
that was not justified by the State’s “interest in making sure that 
an initiative has sufficient grass roots support to be placed on the 
ballot, or by its interest in protecting the integrity of the 
initiative process.”47 
In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 
Inc.,48 the Court struck down Colorado’s requirement that 
initiative petition circulators wear an I.D. badge bearing the 
circulator’s name, as well as its requirement that initiative 
proponents report the names, addresses, and compensation 
received by each paid initiative circulator. The Court determined 
that the petition circulators’ and the petition signatories’ conduct 
expressed a political view and, therefore, implicated a First 
Amendment right.49 
Constitutional Law Professor Akihil Reed Amar criticized 
the Court’s conclusion—that initiative petition circulation and 
signature gathering constitutes expressive activity entitled to 
First Amendment protection—shortly after the A.C.L.F. opinion 
was issued.  
The Colorado initiative process is not about “petitions.” It’s about 
state lawmaking. Strictly speaking, the state was not regulating 
“petitions” or “speech” at all. It was merely saying that unless 
signatures were collected in a certain way, they would not count for 
purposes of the state initiative process. In other words, anyone in 
 
 44 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). 
 45 Id. at 421. 
 46 Id. at 420. 
 47 Id. at 420, 425. 
 48 Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999). 
 49 See id. at 192. 
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Colorado has a right to petition to his heart’s content—to do so 
anonymously and with no disclosure, even if he is not a registered 
voter. But he has no First Amendment right to insist that Colorado 
treat his petition as anything more than a handbill. Most importantly, 
Colorado was not trying to treat a nonconforming signature as 
anything less than a handbill, fully protected by the First 
Amendment. Colorado merely said that unless its rules were followed, 
any signature gathered would be treated as a petition, pure and 
simple. 
 To see the point another way, imagine that I go to Denver next 
week and demand a right to vote for Mickey Mouse as governor. 
Surely Colorado need not count my vote in the next election because 
(a) I am not a registered Colorado voter, (b) Mickey Mouse is not an 
eligible candidate, and (c) the state may properly insist that all ballots 
be cast on election day, or pursuant to a regulated absentee ballot 
system. In one sense I can “vote” for Mickey—just watch me!—and the 
state would be wrong to punish me. But the state has a perfect right 
not to count my vote. The facts of Buckley are no different.50 
Professor Akhil Amar’s brother, Constitutional Law Professor 
Vikram David Amar, used the same reasoning to argue that the 
signing of an initiative is not subject to First Amendment 
protection because it is citizen lawmaking. 
The Court’s reasoning in [the A.C.L.F. and Meyer v. Grant] cases 
seems plausible if plaintiffs were “petitioning” within the meaning of 
the First Amendment. But that label is inapt. The Colorado initiative 
process is not about “petitioning the Government for a redress of 
grievances.” It is about circumventing government by engaging in 
lawmaking itself. Thus, state law did not regulate “petitions” or 
“speech” at all. Instead, it merely provided that unless signatures 
were collected in a certain way, they would not count for purposes of 
qualifying an initiative for the statewide ballot.51 
These commentators suggest that the ballot initiative process 
consists of legally operative legislative acts that are not subject to 
First Amendment protection. 
B.  John Doe No. 1 v. Reed and the Disclosure of the Identity of 
Petition Signatories 
In John Doe No. 1 v. Reed,52 the Supreme Court considered 
a   challenge to the State of Washington’s Public Records 
 
 50 Akhil Reed Amar, The Five-Legged Dog, AM. LAW., Sept. 1999, at 47, 47. 
 51 Vikram David Amar, Adventures in Direct Democracy: The Top Ten Constitutional 
Lessons from the California Recall Experience, 92 CAL. L. REV. 927, 929 (2004); see also 
S.F. Forty-Niners v. Nishioka, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 388, 396 (Ct. App. 1999) (“The initiative 
petition with its notice of intention is not a handbill or campaign flyer—it is an official 
election document . . . . It is the constitutionally and legislatively sanctioned method by 
which an election is obtained on a given initiative proposal.”). 
 52 John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010). 
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Act,53 which authorizes private parties to obtain copies of 
government documents, including referendum petitions revealing 
the identities of petition signatories. The State of Washington 
argued that Washington’s disclosure requirements did not 
implicate First Amendment rights because “signing a petition is 
a legally operative legislative act, not speech.”54 
The act of signing an initiative petition is a legislative act 
because the electors are exercising legislative power and acting 
as citizen legislators. No one person can place a measure on the 
ballot. It requires the support of other electors in order to qualify 
for the ballot. This requirement—gathering signatures to ensure 
a significant level of support for placing the measure on the 
ballot—“is analogous to the parliamentary rule that a motion 
must be seconded before it will be considered.”55 Individual 
electors do not control the content of the petition. Once the 
official sponsor supplies the appropriate state official with a 
petition in proper form for circulation, the electors can choose to 
sign the petition or not. They can lobby others to sign (or not to 
sign) the petition—certainly expressive conduct protected by the 
First Amendment—but the decision whether to sign is 
binary: “Yes” or “No.” Each signature has exactly the same legal 
effect. It is a legally operative legislative act. 
Several prominent legal scholars agree with this position.56 
Professor Eugene Volokh wrote: 
[P]olitical statements are just speech. Signing an initiative, 
referendum, or recall petition is a legally operative act—it helps 
achieve a particular result not just because of its persuasiveness, but 
because it is given legal effect by the state election law. 
 The government is surely entitled to require that people who want 
their signature to have such a legally operative effect must disclose 
their identities to the government. And I see no reason why the 
government might not then disclose those identities to the public, who 
after all are in charge of the government. To do that is to inform the 
people about who is taking legally operative steps to change the 
state’s laws (or the state’s elected representatives, in the case of a 
recall).57 
 
 53 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.56.001–42.56.904 (West 2015). 
 54 Brief of Respondent Sam Reed at 22, Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (No. 09-559). 
 55 DELOS F. WILCOX, GOVERNMENT BY ALL THE PEOPLE: THE INITIATIVE, THE 
REFERENDUM, AND THE RECALL AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY 16 (Da Capo Press 1972) 
(1912); see also Brief of Respondent Sam Reed, supra note 54, at 26–28. 
 56 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Direct Democracy Scholars in Support of Respondents 
at 7, Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (No. 09-559) (“The referendum is a legislative act and is central to 
the lawmaking process in Washington.”); id. at 5 (“This Court has never decided whether 
the act of signing, as distinct from circulating, a petition is a form of ‘core political 
speech.’”). 
 57 Eugene Volokh, Federal Judge Temporarily Restrains Release of Names of 
Do Not Delete 3/5/2016 12:01 PM 
2016] Direct Democracy as a Legislative Act 209 
The Supreme Court ultimately determined, however, that 
the petition circulators’ and the petition signatories’ conduct 
expressed a political view and, therefore, implicated a First 
Amendment right.58 The Court considered the argument that 
“signing a petition is a legally operative legislative act” and, 
therefore, not subject to First Amendment protection, but 
concluded that “[p]etition signing remains expressive even when 
it has legal effect in the electoral process.”59 The Court reviewed 
such challenges under “exacting scrutiny,” which “requires a 
‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a 
‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.”60 
Justice Scalia concurred with the Supreme Court’s judgment 
in Reed, but he wrote separately to express his “doubt” that the 
act of signing a referendum petition implicates “the ‘freedom of 
speech’ at all.”61 For Justice Scalia, an elector’s conduct in 
signing a referendum petition was a legislative act: 
A voter who signs a referendum petition is therefore exercising 
legislative power because his signature, somewhat like a vote for or 
against a bill in the legislature, seeks to affect the legal force of the 
measure at issue.62 
Justice Scalia noted that the Reed plaintiffs could not identify 
any Supreme Court precedent “holding that legislating is 
protected by the First Amendment.”63 
While no other justices joined Justice Scalia’s concurrence, it 
raises several interesting questions: Are there some direct 
democracy procedures that are, in fact, legislative acts? If so, 
what is the significance of a legislative act? What is the legal 
significance, if any, of citizens as legislators? 
 
Anti-Domestic-Partnership Petition Signers in Washington States, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Sept. 11, 2009, 9:57 AM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/chain_1245174890.shtml [http:// 
perma.cc/T7Y7-BQA4]; see also Rick Hasen, Ninth Circuit Issues Its Opinion Explaining 
Its Ruling in Washington R-71 Referendum Case, ELECTION L. BLOG (Oct. 22, 2009, 
4:25 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/014620.html  [http://perma.cc/X6U3-L9PU] 
(“What about Burdick v. Takushi, and the Supreme Court's rejection of the idea that 
voting is an expressive activity entitled to First Amendment protection? Does this or does 
this not apply to signing a ballot measure petition?”). 
 58 Reed, 561 U.S. at 195. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 196 (citations omitted) (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010)).  
 61 Id. at 219 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 62 Id. at 221–22. 
 63 Id. at 222; cf. Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 595–602 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that New York unreasonably burdened the First Amendment 
rights clustered around the state’s initiative process by allowing legislative bodies to 
amend popularly passed measures and holding that plaintiffs’ argument did not even 
raise a First Amendment issue). 
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C. Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs and Fair Competition v. Norris 
and the Role of the Official Proponent 
In Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs and Fair Competition 
v. Norris,64 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, considered First 
Amendment challenges to requirements of the State of California 
and the City of Chula Vista (i) that the official proponent of a 
ballot measure (the person who sponsors a local ballot measure) 
must be an elector (and therefore not a corporation) and (ii) that 
the name of the official proponent (the person who sponsors a 
local ballot measure) appear on each section of the petition that 
is circulated to voters for their signature. The Ninth Circuit 
upheld the elector requirement because it “does not impose any 
meaningful burden on First Amendment rights.”65 The City and 
State defendants contended that the elector requirement did not 
implicate First Amendment rights “because it is a regulation of 
the legislative process,” but the court declined to decide that 
question, given that the elector requirement survived First 
Amendment scrutiny.66 The court described the elector 
requirement as a “legislative power,” and noted that “many 
legislative and official political acts are properly reserved to 
members of the electorate.”67 
The initiative power that California and the City of Chula Vista have 
reserved to electors is indisputably a legislative power. . . . Much like 
a legislator who begins the traditional legislative process by placing a 
bill in the hopper, an official proponent commences the process of 
legislating by initiative by asking voters to sign a petition to place an 
initiative on the ballot. Thus, by seeking to serve as official 
proponents, the plaintiffs seek to wield a legislative power.68 
The official proponent of a ballot initiative serves a “unique 
role” in the legislative process that is distinct from the role of other 
electors who may support the ballot initiative. The official 
proponent controls and manages the initiative process—preparing 
the text of the petition, filing it, managing the signature-gathering 
process and the signature gatherers, filing the signatures, and 
responding to challenges to the petitions and signatures.69 In 
California, the official proponent also has special authority to 
defend the initiative against legal challenge, if public officials 
decline to do so.70 
 
 64 Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 782 F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 
2015) (en banc).  
 65 Id. at 529.  
 66 Id. at 529 n.8.  
 67 Id. at 529 (emphasis added).  
 68 Id. at 529–30 (citations omitted).  
 69 Id. at 530. 
 70 Id. (quoting Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 2011)); see also infra 
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Thus, while all California voters play a quasi-legislative role in the 
initiative process, the official proponent is particularly akin to a 
legislator—sponsoring legislation and shepherding it through the 
legislative process. Indeed, like a legislator introducing legislation, 
and unlike a mere lobbyist (the plaintiffs’ preferred characterization), 
an official proponent performs a series of necessary steps for the 
people to exercise the power to legislate by initiative.71 
The Ninth Circuit also applied exacting scrutiny to the 
disclosure requirement and upheld that requirement.72 The en 
banc panel acknowledged that the “legislative character of an 
initiative petition inform[ed] [its] analysis,”73 but it did not 
consider whether the disclosure requirement was a “legislative 
act.” Instead, the “legislative character” and the public nature of 
being the “official proponent” influenced the court’s First 
Amendment analysis and the court concluded that exacting 
scrutiny—not strict scrutiny—applied.74 
D. When Direct Democracy Is a Legislative Act 
The more that direct democracy procedures regulate 
advocacy for, and circulation of, an initiative petition, the more 
that these procedures regulate “core political speech.”75 But these 
activities are different from the mechanics of initiation of a 
petition.76 
Voters act as legislators in the ballot-measure context, and interest 
groups and individuals advocating a measure’s defeat or passage act 
as lobbyists; both groups aim at pressuring the public to pass or defeat 
legislation. We think Californians, as lawmakers, have an interest in 
knowing who is lobbying for their vote, just as members of Congress  
may require lobbyists to disclose who is paying for the lobbyists’ 
services and how much.77 
The act of sponsoring an initiative or referendum petition—
drafting and submitting it to the Secretary of State—is a 
necessary first step in law-making. It is a legislative act that can 
only be done by the members of the relevant legislative body—
 
Section IV.C. 
 71 Id. at 530–31. 
 72 Id. at 535–42. 
 73 Id. at 536. 
 74 Id. at 536–37. 
 75 See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22 (1988) (involving a law that placed a 
ban on payment of signature gatherers); see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law 
Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (involving a statute that required initiative petition 
circulators to wear I.D. badge bearing circulator’s name and initiative proponents to 
report names, addresses, and amounts paid to each paid initiative circulator). 
 76 See Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 875 F. Supp. 2d 
1128, 1133–35 (S.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded, 755 F.3d 671 
(9th Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 782 F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 77 Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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here, the electors—who choose to sponsor a proposed initiative.78 
Likewise, an initiative or referendum petition that is filed with 
the state (usually the Secretary of State) is a legislative 
document, and the act of filing a petition is a legislative act.79 In 
addition, the act of submitting petition signatures to the state to 
qualify for the ballot is a legislative act that is performed by the 
sponsors of an initiative. 
Individual states may require direct democracy actions by 
the sponsor of an initiative or referendum that constitute 
legislative acts. In Utah, for example, the official sponsors of an 
initiative must hold seven public hearings in different geographic 
regions of the state.80 The official sponsors must provide notice of 
the hearings, and either video tape or audio tape the meeting or 
“take comprehensive minutes of the pubic hearing, detailing the 
names and titles of each speaker and summarizing each 
speaker’s comments.”81 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY AS A LEGISLATIVE ACT 
A. No First Amendment Protection 
As noted above, if a particular act of direct democracy is a 
legislative act it may take the activity outside the scope of the 
First Amendment.82 The more that the activity in question 
involves the mechanics of initiation of a petition and submission 
of the petition to qualify for the ballot, the more likely that it is a 
legislative act that is outside the scope of the First Amendment. 
But what other legal implications, if any, are there for legislative 
acts undertaken by citizen lawmakers?  
B. Legislative Immunity 
The Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t is well established 
that federal, state, and regional legislators are entitled to 
absolute immunity from civil liability for their legislative 
activities.”83 If direct democracy constitutes a legislative act and 
 
 78 Chula Vista, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. 
 79 This distinction between expressive activity and the mechanics of legislation is the 
reason that a majority of courts have held that initiative and referendum subject matter 
restrictions do not raise a free speech issue. See NOYES, supra note 7, at 109–20; see also 
Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1102 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(“[The First Amendment] does not apply to structural principles of government making 
some outcomes difficult or impossible to achieve.”).  
 80 UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-204.1 (West 2015). 
 81 Id. 
 82 See John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 222 (2010) (Scalia, J, concurring) 
(“Plaintiffs point to no precedent from this Court holding that legislating is protected by 
the First Amendment.”). 
 83 Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 46 (1998); see also Supreme Court of Va. 
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if the official sponsors of an initiative or referendum petition are 
acting as legislators when they (1) sponsor an initiative or 
referendum, (2) file an initiative or referendum petition, and 
(3)  file petition signatures with the state, then they may be 
entitled to legislative immunity for these legislative acts that 
they undertake.84 
Legislative immunity provides immunity from trial and from 
civil and criminal liability for performing legislative acts.85 
Legislative acts include sponsoring and introducing a bill,86 
which is akin to being an official sponsor of an initiative or 
referendum petition and filing the petition with the state. 
Legislative acts  also may include holding hearings on proposed 
legislation.87 
The doctrine of legislative immunity does not prevent a court 
from declaring a legislative act to be unconstitutional,88 but it 
does protect those engaging in the legislative act from liability for 
the act.89 The legislative immunity doctrine also includes the 
legislative testimonial privilege90 and a ban on inquiry into the 
motive behind legislative action.91 
 
v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732 (1980) (“[The Court has] recognized 
that state legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their legislative acts, 
an immunity that is similar in origin and rationale to that accorded Congressmen under 
the Speech or Debate Clause.”). As of 2003, forty-three state constitutions contained one 
or more provisions granting state legislators a legal privilege in connection with their 
legislative work. See Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege 
in State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 221 (2003). Despite not having such a 
provision in their state constitutions, several of the remaining seven states have 
recognized some type of legislative immunity by statute or judicial opinion. Id. at 237–38 
n.54. California, for example, recognizes the principle of legislative immunity. See Steiner 
v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 668, 678 (Ct. App. 1996) (“[L]egislators have absolute 
immunity from damage suits based on legislative acts.”).  
 84 See Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 279 (4th Cir. 1980) (“[I]f legislators of any 
political subdivision of a state function in a legislative capacity, they are absolutely 
immune from being sued . . . .”). 
 85 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); see also Consumers Union of U.S., 
Inc., 446 U.S. at 720. 
 86 See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); see also Hinshaw v. Smith, 
436 F.3d 997, 1008–09 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 87 See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624 (1972). 
 88 See Romer v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 810 P.2d 215 (Colo. 1991); see also 
Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 89 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).  
 90 See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 615–16 (stating that privilege against testifying 
concerning legislative activities applies in a criminal case to senator and also to the 
legislator’s aides). The legislative testimonial privilege applies in civil cases in which the 
legislator is a party. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502–03 
(1975). In addition, it applies in civil cases in which the legislator is not a party. See 
Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that legislative 
testimony privilege protects a legislator from having to testify in a civil action in which 
the legislator is not a party concerning the legislator’s “legislative acts”). 
 91 See Greenburg v. Collier, 482 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Va. 1979) (granting protective 
order in favor of state legislator prohibiting inquiry into “any legislative activity or his 
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C. Standing to Defend the Initiative 
Direct democracy as a legislative act also may impact the 
initiative proponents’ standing to defend the initiative against 
legal challenge. In Hollingsworth v. Perry,92 the Supreme Court 
was asked to address the merits of Proposition 8—California’s 
ballot initiative to amend the California Constitution to 
eliminate the right of same-sex couples to marry. Plaintiffs had 
challenged Proposition 8 as violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State of California 
“refused to defend [Proposition 8], although they . . . continued to 
enforce it throughout [the] litigation.” Thus, the federal district 
court allowed the official proponents to intervene and defend the 
action.93 Article III standing was not an issue because the 
plaintiffs were aggrieved—Proposition 8 prevented them from 
getting married.94 The district court then held a two-week long 
trial and found that Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.95 
Standing became an issue upon appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 
Plaintiffs had won; they had no reason to seek appeal. The State 
of California refused to defend Proposition 8, so it did not appeal. 
Proposition 8’s proponents appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The 
Ninth Circuit asked petitioners (the official Proposition 8 
proponents) to address “why this appeal should not be dismissed 
for lack of Article III standing.”96 After considering the parties’ 
responses, the Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme 
Court the question whether, under California law, the official 
proponents of a ballot initiative  
possess either a particularized interest in the initiative’s validity or 
the authority to assert the State’s interest in the initiative’s validity, 
which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the 
initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the 
initiative, when the public officials charged with that duty refuse to do 
so.97  
 
motive for same” on the basis of federal common law legislative immunity); see also 
Knights of Columbus v. Town of Lexington, 138 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D. Mass. 2001); 
Steiner  v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 668, 676 (Ct. App. 1996) (“An equally 
important corollary of the separation of powers doctrine is courts cannot inquire into the 
impetus or motive behind legislative action.”). 
 92 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 93 Id. at 2660. 
 94 Id. at 2661–62. 
 95 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 96 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 
2010). 
 97 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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The California Supreme Court accepted the question and 
answered in the affirmative.98 Based on the California Supreme 
Court’s response, the Ninth Circuit held that the official 
Proposition 8 proponents had Article III standing to defend the 
measure on appeal in federal court, and then affirmed the 
district court’s decision on the merits.99 
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to address the merits of 
Proposition 8. Instead, the Court held that the official 
Proposition 8 proponents lacked Article III standing.100 The 
Court noted that the proponents were “plainly not agents of the 
State—‘formal’ or otherwise”—and that they, “[u]nlike 
California’s elected officials, . . . ha[d] taken no oath of office.”101 
Professor Vikram David Amar has emphasized the importance of 
this distinction: 
[A]llowing initiative-proponent standing poses serious problems that 
permitting legislator standing does not. Most fundamentally, the fact 
that voters adopted an initiative measure that the proponents wrote 
and offered does not mean that the electorate decided—or intended—
that these proponents should speak or act for the voters in any 
representative capacity.102 
This distinction is critical. There is a difference between the 
person (or group) who drafts and proposes a law and the 
institution or body that is empowered to enact a proposal into 
law. It is noteworthy that in the legislator-standing context, the 
standing that is permitted is the standing of elected leaders of the 
legislative body, who speak not for themselves as individual 
lawmakers, but rather on behalf of the entire lawmaking body. 
By contrast, the individual members of the legislature who may 
have been involved in—or even central to—the proposing, 
drafting, or lobbying with respect to a bill generally do not enjoy 
standing to defend the measure. As important as these members 
might have been in bringing the law about, they are not (and do 
not speak for) the entire lawmaking body whose votes made the 
proposal law.103 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry did 
not, however, resolve the problem of standing when direct 
democracy is a legislative act. The Court’s opinion left us in a 
 
 98 Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1033 (Cal. 2011). 
 99 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub 
nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 100 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668. 
 101 Id. at 2666–67. 
 102 Vikram David Amar, Standing Up for Direct Democracy: Who Can Be Empowered 
Under Article III to Defend Initiatives In Federal Court?, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 473, 480 
(2014). 
 103 Id. at 480–81 (2014). 
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very curious place where the official proponents of a ballot 
initiative will, with increasing frequency, have standing to 
defend their initiative against legal attack.  
First, the Supreme Court’s opinion held only that the official 
proponents lacked standing in federal court to defend their 
initiative on appeal.104 The official proponents will continue to be 
able to intervene and defend their initiative against attack at 
trial when the state fails or refuses to do so. The official 
proponents also will continue to have standing in state court to 
defend their initiative on appeal. At least where (as in California) 
the state supreme court so says. This might lead to an odd 
situation: assume that the Proposition 8 plaintiff had brought 
their Equal Protection Clause violation claim in California state 
court and had prevailed. Assume that the California Supreme 
Court determined (as it did) that the official proponents had 
standing, under California law, to defend Proposition 8 and also 
determined that Proposition 8 violates the U.S. Constitution. 
Would the official proponents then have standing, under Article 
III, to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court?105 
Second, in response to the Supreme Court’s Hollingsworth 
decision, ballot initiative proponents are making it express in the 
initiative itself that they are agents of the state, thereby 
addressing the concern about lack of agency. These official 
proponents are also including language in their initiatives that 
the electorate decided—and intended—that these proponents 
should speak and act for the voters and the state itself in a 
representative capacity, thereby addressing the concern raised by 
Professor Amar. The language of the initiative that amends the 
state constitution empowers the initiative proponents with 
standing to defend the initiative in any court proceedings. 
The California “Online Privacy” initiative (#14-0007), for 
example, contained the following provision:  
Proponent Standing.  
(a)   The people of the State of California declare that the proponents 
of this Act have a direct and personal stake in defending this Act 
and grant formal authority to the proponents to defend this Act in 
any legal proceeding, either by intervening in such legal 
proceeding, or by defending the Act on behalf of the people and 
the State in the event that the State declines to defend the Act or 
declines to appeal an adverse ruling or judgment against the Act. 
 
 104 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652. 
 105 See NOYES, supra note 7, at 10; William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” 
Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263, 
294−95 (1990). 
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(b)   In the event that the proponents are defending this Act in a legal 
proceeding because the State has declined to defend it or to 
appeal an adverse ruling or judgment against it, the proponents 
shall: 
(1) act as agents of the people and the State; 
(2) be subject to all ethical, legal, and fiduciary duties applicable 
to such parties in such legal proceeding; and 
(3) take and be subject to the Oath of Office prescribed by Article 
XX, section 3 of the California Constitution for the limited 
purpose of acting on behalf of the people and the State in such 
legal proceeding.106 
An initiative on abortion restrictions being circulated for 
signatures for the 2016 ballot contains a similar provision.107 
Thus, Hollingsworth did not end the debate over standing of 
ballot initiatives’ official proponents. It has led to the practical 
expression of direct democracy as legislative act—the official 
proponents will ask the electorate to approve the merits of their 
initiative and to bless them as the substitute voice of the 
legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
My aim in this Article is two-fold: first, to demonstrate that 
states, courts, and direct democracy proponents have begun to 
treat direct democracy as a legislative act, and second, to begin to 
consider some of the practical and legal consequences of the 
conclusion that direct democracy is a legislative act. As people 
take political matters into their own hands, they seek to give 
themselves greater legislative power and to acquire more of the 
perks and powers of being a (citizen) legislator engaging in 
legislative acts.  
 
 106 The Online Privacy Act, Initiative 14-0007, § 5 (Cal. 2014), https://oag.ca.gov/ 
system/files/initiatives/pdfs/14-0007%20(14-0007%20(Online%20Privacy%20V2)).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9VR9-ZWBR]; see also Local Control and Accountability in Education 
Act, Initiative 15-0078, § 15 (Cal. 2015), https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/ 
15-0078%20(Certificated%20Employees%20Policy%20Decisions).pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ9 
W-A4HC]. 
 107 See Parental Notification, Child and Teen Safety, and Stop Sexual Predators and 
Sex Traffickers Act, Initiative 15-0025, § 32(u) (Cal. 2015), http://www.oag.ca.gov/system/ 
files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0025%20%28Parental%20Notification%29.pdf [http://perma.cc/VS 
2M-ARBU] (containing a proposed California Constitutional Amendment Initiative 
providing that “the following persons, given priority in the order named, shall be 
authorized to defend the provisions of this Section approved by voters in any court of law: 
any official proponent of this Initiative, his or her designee, and any elector at the time 
this Initiative was approved by the voters”). 
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